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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The happy or unprosperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a
good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost
always too animates our gratitude or resentment, our sense of the merit or
demerit of the design.
-Adam Smith'
INTRODUCTION
When people make decisions about blame and punishment,
harm matters. Adam Smith captured a powerful intuition when he
asserted that, as a factual matter about human judgment, an unfortu-
nate outcome prompts resentment, whereas a fortunate outcome
prompts gratitude, and ourjudgment of an actor's culpability rests on
the fortuity of the outcome. 2 Smith invites us to consider a person
who hurls a large stone over a wall into a public street, without regard
to where it might fall.3 If the stone should accidentally kill a man,
severe punishment (even the death penalty) for the stone hurler
would be consistent with our natural sentiments. But it would be
"shocking to our natural sense of equity . . . to bring a man to the
scaffold merely for having thrown a stone carelessly into the street
without hurting any body."4
The criminal law, too, recognizes that harm matters, even when
the harm in question is unforeseeable or adventitious. In most juris-
dictions, for example, attempted murder and murder are punished
differently.5 Yet, whether a shooting victim dies or lives might depend
on how quickly the ambulance arrived, whether the bullet hit or
missed a vital organ, the skill of the surgeons who happened to be on
call at the hospital, the victim's general health, and a host of other
circumstances over which the perpetrator has no control and which
he could not have foreseen. In this sense, the criminal law seems to
track closely our intuition that blame and punishment should corre-
spond to harm, even if the harm is unforeseeable or adventitious.
But is it really the case that intuitions about punishment and
blame track harm at all times and under all circumstances? The dis-
tinction between attempted and completed crimes is just one example
of the many ways in which the adventitious consequences of harm
might (or might not) affect our sentiments about culpability and pun-
ishment. For example, does the type of harm (e.g., physical, financial,
emotional) matter? Is the identity of the person who suffers the harm
I ADAM SMrrH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 152 (London, Harrison & Sons
1853) (1759).
2 See id.
3 Id. at 148-49.
4 Id. at 149.
5 In California, for example, the sentence for an attempt is one-half the sentence
otherwise applicable for the completed crime. CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1999).
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(e.g., a nurse or a homeless drug addict) important? Is the remoteness
of the crime's harmful consequences (e.g., emotional suffering or
stress that eventually leads to a heart attack) significant?
Ultimately, these are empirical questions. 6 The answers to these
questions directly influence criminal sentencing generally, and capital
punishment in particular, resulting in grave and irreversible conse-
quences. The role that harm may or may not play in punishment
judgments has been the subject of recent debate regarding victim im-
pact testimony. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Payne v.
Tennessee to permit surviving friends and family of homicide victims
to testify about the character of the victim and the emotional and psy-
chological impact of the victim's death, commentators have criticized
this type of testimony for its effects on capital sentencing., In particu-
lar, there is a concern that the use of victim impact statements will
introduce arbitrariness into the capital sentencing process and will re-
present a step backwards from Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Geor-
gia,10 both of which emphasized the need for consistency in capital
sentencing systems. "
The harms described in victim impact statements raise a variety of
concerns about the adventitious nature of these statements and their
impact on the decision about whether the defendant will ultimately
live or die. First, commentators are particularly concerned that victim
impact statements highlight the perceived relative worth of the victim,
and consequently that the jury's judgment about whether to impose
6 In addition to these empirical questions about how variations in harm influence
people's attitudes about punishment, there are also normative questions about how such
variations in harm ought to affect punishment. For the purposes of this Article, we focus
on the former question.
7 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
8 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Ci. L.
REv. 361, 392-93 (1996) (noting that victim impact statements are stories that should not
be told in the context of capital sentencing because they overwhelm the jury and interfere
with its ability to empathize with the defendant); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Vic-
timhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 96-101 (noting that the jury's focus on the victim during
the sentencing phase will lead to stereotyping and insufficient weight to mitigating fac-
tors); Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact
Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARZ. L. REv. 143, 191-92 (1999) (suggesting that limits on the
use of victim impact statements are necessary to reduce the resulting arbitrariness in capi-
tal sentencing); Niru Shanker, Getting a Grip on Payne and Restricting the Influence of Victim
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing: The Timothy McVeigh Case and Various State Approaches
Compared, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 711, 740 (1999) (concluding that the prejudicial effect
of victim impact statements must be restricted).
9 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10o 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
1 1 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 (upholding defendant's capital sentence under Geor-
gia's sentencing procedures because those procedures focused the jury's attention on the
particularized nature of the defendant and the crime); Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (overturning defendants' capital sentences because the statutes under
which they were sentenced were susceptible to arbitrary and capricious application).
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the death sentence will be influenced by this inappropriate factor. 12
In this sense, whether someone kills a person of high or low standing
is adventitious because the death reflects neither the murderer's
mental state nor the morality of the act itself.'3 In addition, victim
impact statements detail the various harms that befall the victim or
the victim's family after a crime, which might include financial com-
plications resulting from a crime, stress-induced illnesses, and various
other consequences that a defendant might not have been able to
foresee at the time of the crime. 14 In this Article, we focus on one
specific consequence that is very often the subject of victim impact
statements: emotional harm to victims or survivors, We isolate this
issue because, compared to other types of harms, it is particularly sub-
jective, amorphous, and likely to vary across individuals and circum-
stances. In short, the emotional fallout of a crime to a victim or a
victim's family is a paradigmatic example of adventitious harm.
Does evidence about emotional harm inform people's judgments
about punishment? In this Article, we report our own empirical find-
ings from a new experiment suggesting that adventitious, emotional
harm affects jurors' sentencing decisions. In discussing our findings,
we consider a number of psychological principles that may account
for people's reliance, at least in part, on emotional harm as a factor in
determining punishment. Because these are general principles, we
have no reason to believe that they are particular to one type of crime
or another. Therefore, although our study and much of our discus-
sion consider the general influence of emotional harm information
on punishment, we end by considering its consequences in capital
sentencing in particular.
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the role of retribution in the
psychology of punishment. In Part II, we examine the nature of acci-
dental harm in the psychology of punishment and victim impact state-
ments as a species of such accidental harm. In Part III, we present
empirical evidence that suggests that victim impact statements do in
fact influence lay sentencing decisions. After discussing the results of
this empirical research, in Part IV we examine several social psycho-
logical explanations for the influence of adventitious harm in general,
and victim impact statements in particular, on punishment judg-
ments. Finally, we conclude by discussing recommendations for re-
12 See, e.g., Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of
Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 105-06 (1997).
13 For empirical data on this issue, see Edith Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases: Does the Victim's Character Matter?, 28J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 145, 154 (1998)
(finding that greater victim "respectability" led to judgments that the crime was more
serious).
14 For examples of victim impact statements admitted into evidence but describing
harms that are arguably causally remote, see Logan, supra note 8, at 160-65.
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ducing the arbitrariness produced by the introduction of victim
impact statements in capital sentencing hearings.
I
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT: THE EVIDENCE
THAT PEOPLE ARE GENERALLY MOTIVATED BY
HARM-BASED RETRIBUTION
Although philosophers have identified a number of different
goals associated with punishing criminals-including deterring the of-
fender from committing future crime, deterring others from crime,
isolating and incapacitating the offender, rehabilitating the offender,
and retributionl 5-there is a separate empirical question about the
extent to which these or other factors actually motivate laypersons'
punishment preferences. Empirical research on the psychology ofjus-
tice supports an emerging consensus that people's punishment judg-
ments are guided to a large degree by a harm-based retributive
psychology. Some research, for example, has examined the extent to
which laypersons' ideas about punishment comport with federal sen-
tencing guidelines, in order to learn whether the guidelines are at
odds with lay intuitions about justice. 16 Similarly, Paul Robinson and
John Darley have studied the extent to which laypersons' punishment
judgments accurately reflect criminal law principles embodied in state
statutes and the Model Penal Code.17 Other research has focused on
the consistency between laypersons' punishment intuitions and legal
principles regarding punitive damages in civil cases. 18 In most in-
stances, people's punishment judgments track the harm caused by the
crime. For example, laypeople and judges alike typically believe that a
person who steals five dollars from a church poor box should be pun-
ished less severely than a person who embezzles fifty thousand dollars
from the same church. 19 The fact that judges pay particular attention
to harm in determining punishment judgments is evidenced in their
15 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 178-79 (1948); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194-98 (W. Hastie
trans., 1887); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 125-26 (1988).
16 See, e.g., PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDE-
LINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997).
17 See PAUL H. ROBINSON &JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMU-
NITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
18 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
Punitive Damages, 16J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 62-63 (1998) (finding thatjury punishment
judgments are affected by juror outrage at the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 243-44
(2000) (finding that people reject the notion that punishment should vary with probability
of detection).
19 See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINALS 66-68 (1988).
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own descriptions of their sentencing practices for white-collar
crimes. 20
Thus, as an empirical matter, people generally are motivated to
punish so that the offender suffers as the offender has made others
suffer,21 and to impose the punishment that the offender deserves for
the wrong that he or she has committed. 22 In other words, punish-
ment decisions generally reflect a moral reaction to a wrong-a sense
of deservingness. 23 This motivation to punish based on the moral na-
ture of the offense appears to be independent of the punishment's
potential to satisfy other sentencing goals such as deterrence. 24 In-
deed, as a psychological matter, a retributive philosophy has been de-
scribed as the "default" sentencing strategy.2 5 That is, when people
are instructed to punish based on retribution, their sentences corre-
spond most closely with sentences given without explicit instructions
on strategy. 26 Finally, when asked to rank the philosophies they be-
lieve should guide sentencing, people explicitly choose retribution as
the most important principle.27
As demonstrated in research on people's reactions to accidents,
attention to harm in determining punishment judgments sometimes
includes attention to adventitious harm. For example, the more se-
vere an accident victim's injury, the more blame and responsibility
people attribute to the person who caused the accident.28 One expla-
nation for this phenomenon is that people are motivated to make de-
20 See, e.g., id. at 62-80.
21 See Sandra Graham et al., An Altributional Analysis of Punishment Goals and Public
Reaction to O.J. Simpson, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331, 333, 336 (1997)
(describing empirical research that shows retribution to be one of the most important
goals of punishment); V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Punishment and the Individual in
the United States and Japan, 22 LAw & Soc'v REV. 301, 318-19 (1988) (same).
22 See, e.g.,John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment,
24 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660-71 (2000) (presenting empirical results to support the
conclusion that when people impose punishment, they are motivated by just deserts
considerations).
2. See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW
31, 35 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (noting that "retributive justice is
concerned with the moral nature of the offense").
24 SeeJonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 31-32 (1993) (finding that many people do
not apply the deterrence rationale when reasoning about compensation and punishment);
Sunstein et al., supra note 17, at 239.
25 See Darley et al., supra note 22, at 666-67.
26 Id. (contrasting no instruction with retribution and incapacitation strategies); Rob-
ert M. McFatter, Sentencing Strategies and Justice: Effects of Punishment Philosophy on Sentencing
Decisions, 36J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1490, 1494, 1498 (1978) (contrasting no in-
struction with deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution strategies).
27 See Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment and Support for the Death
Penalty, 21 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 95, 99-101 (1984).
28 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibility ": A Meta-
Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2575, 2601 (2000).
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fensive attributions.29 In other words, when harm is severe, people
are threatened by the possibility that a similarly serious injury could
befall them. In order to reassure themselves that such severe out-
comes do not occur accidentally or randomly, people assign greater
responsibility for the harm to the relevant actors.30 For example, a
driver whose unoccupied parked car rolls down a hill is judged to be
more responsible and more blameworthy when the car happens to hit
and injure a group of pedestrians than when the same car happens to
hit a tree and injures no one. People assign responsibility and blame
in this manner despite the fact that in both scenarios, the driver's state
of mind and behavior were identical.
The severity of harm therefore influences judgments of responsi-
bility and blame. Moreover, severity affects judgments about adventi-
tiousness itself. In particular, people view adventitious consequences
as less adventitious when the harm is serious than when the harm is
minor. This tendency is illustrated in a hypothetical in which a bank
robber's bullet misses its intended target (the teller who is pressing
the alarm), and hits a bank customer instead.3' Under these circum-
stances, people are less willing to acknowledge the chance nature of
the harm to the customer when the harm is severe (victim is para-
lyzed) than when the harm is mild (victim is grazed by bullet).32 We
find it threatening to believe that a severe outcome could be due to
chance because that would imply that it could happen to us. We
therefore reduce the threat of accidental harms by viewing the event
as non-accidental and assigning more responsibility to the agent of
the harm.3 3 Evidence from a recent meta-analysis of existing studies
forcefully demonstrates that the more severe the harm resulting from
accidents, the greater the perceived responsibility, the greater the
blame for the accident, and the larger the mock jurors' monetary
damage awards.34
This review suggests two conclusions: harm is a critical factor in
people's views about just punishments, and harm is not rendered ir-
relevant simply because it is adventitious or unforeseen. Given these
conclusions, it seems likely that a crime victim's ability to cope emo-
tionally with a crime will influence jurors' ideas about appropriate
29 See Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3J. PERSONAITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 73, 73-74 (1966).
30 See id. at 74.
31 See D. Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attribution of
Responsibility, 2 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76, 78-79 (1974).
32 See id. at 82-84 (finding that respondents attributed more responsibility to the rob-
ber when the consequences of the robber's actions were severe than when they were mild).
33 Not all scholars agree with the defensive attribution explanation. See, e.g., Marilynn
B. Brewer, An Information-Processing Approach to Attribution of Responsibility, 13 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 58, 61-62 (1977).
34 See Robbennolt, supra note 28, at 2601-02.
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punishment. Before addressing this question empirically, we discuss
the unique nature of emotion-based victim impact evidence and the
current status of victim impact statements in criminal trials.
II
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AS SUBJECTIVE
ADVENTITIOUS HARM
A. Background: "The Jurisprudence of Victimhood"3 5
In Booth v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether, in a capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution's presenta-
tion of information about the murder victim's family members' opin-
ions about the crime and about the defendant violated the Eighth
Amendment.36 The Court concluded that presentation of victim im-
pact statements in a capital sentencing hearing creates an unaccept-
able risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, because such evidence diverts the jury's atten-
tion away from the crime and the defendant and toward the character
of the victim and the crime's effect on his family.3 7 Therefore, the
Court noted, "[a] llowing the jury to rely on a [victim impact state-
ment] . . . could result in imposing the death sentence because of
factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrele-
vant to the decision to kill."' 8 Finding this possibility to be unaccept-
able, the Court held that the introduction of victim impact statements
in a capital trial violates the Eighth Amendment.3 9
Only four years later, however, the Court reconsidered its posi-
tion on the constitutionality of victim impact statements. In Payne v.
Tennessee, the State of Tennessee introduced victim impact statements
in the penalty phase of a capital trial in clear violation of the Court's
holding in Booth. 11 In a stark reversal of its decision in Booth, the
Court overruled itself and held that juries may consider victim impact
statements in deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death. 41
Specifically, the Court permitted the victim's family and friends to tes-
tify about the victim's personal characteristics 42 (e.g., "she enjoyed
playing bridge and had many friends") and the crime's psychological
35 Harris, supra note 8, at 77.
-6 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overrled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
37 Id. at 505.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 509.
40 501 U.S. 808, 815-16 (1991).
41 Id. at 828-30.
42 See id. at 814-16, 830. The Payne decision overturned prior precedent only in capi-
tal cases; the sentencing authority's discretion to consider such evidence in noncapital
criminal cases was left undisturbed. See id. at 830 n.2.
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impact on the survivors (e.g., "I still cry every day, even though this
crime happened two years ago").43
The Court's decision in Payne was a major victory for a then-dec-
ade-long movement to empower victims in the criminal justice system.
Under President Ronald Reagan, the President's Task Force on Vic-
tims of Crime issued a report concluding that a serious imbalance
existed between the rights of defendants and the rights of victims, and
proposed a constitutional amendment to allow victims "to be present
and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings. ' 44 The
political momentum and influence of the victims' rights movement
continues to intensify even after Payne, and the wisdom of a constitu-
tional amendment for victims' rights has been debated in recent con-
gressional sessions. 45 Statutes in all fifty states, as well as the U.S.
Code, provide for some form of victims' rights in criminal proceed-
ings generally,46 and at least thirty-two of the thirty-eight death penalty
states permit victim impact statements in the penalty phase of capital
trials. 47
The Payne decision was at once both wholly consistent with the
tenor and goals of the victims' rights movement and highly controver-
sial. 48 The Court itself was bitterly divided, in part because Payne's
holding overturned two prior decisions on the issue.49 In addition,
the majority and dissenting opinions in Payne reveal two radically dif-
ferent views of the appropriate goals of sentencing and of the type of
information that juries should consider when deciding whether to im-
pose the death penalty. Writing for the Payne majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist identified several functions that victim impact statements
serve in the penalty phase of a capital trial. First, the majority con-
tended that victim impact statements reflect the true level of harm
caused by the criminal offense. 50 Criminal law takes harm into ac-
count when apportioning responsibility, even when the harm is partly
attributable to adventitious factors. For example, a successful assassin
bears more legal responsibility than an unsuccessful one whose bullet
43 These examples are loosely based on the victim impact statement presented in
Booth, 482 U.S. at 509-12.
44 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982) (emphasis
omitted).
45 See Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., The Rights of Crime Victims-Does Legal Protection Make a
Difference?, NAT'L INST.JUST. RES. BRIEF (U.S. Dep't of just., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1998, at 1, 1.
46 Id.
47 Logan, supra note 8, at 150.
48 See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal 7ial, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 863,
868-69 (1996).
49 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989) (prohibiting prosecutors'
commentary on victim characteristics in capital trials); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
509 (1987) (prohibiting victim impact testimony in the sentencing phase of capital trials),
overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
50 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
20031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
is deflected. 51 Therefore, a capital jury should likewise consider harm
caused by the offense when deciding whether to impose death as the
penalty. The Payne majority also argued that victim impact statements
serve a balancing function. Because courts permit defendants to pre-
sent mitigating evidence about their background and character in the
penalty phase, victim impact statements are necessary to provide the
jury with an opportunity to consider the victim as a unique individual,
rather than as a "'faceless stranger.'"52
Justice Stevens's dissent, in contrast, raised several concerns
about the propriety of permitting victim impact statements in capital
sentencing hearings, three of which are most relevant here. First, Jus-
tice Stevens contended that the sole purpose of victim impact state-
ments is to incite the emotion of the jury, and that as a consequence
jurors will base their decision whether to impose the death penalty on
emotion rather than reason.53 Second, achieving a balance between
prosecution and defense is not among the goals of criminal prosecu-
tion. Because of this, and because the victim is not a party in criminal
proceedings, the dissent reasoned that no justification exists for the
majority's position that victim impact statements serve a legitimate bal-
ancing purpose. 54 Third, victim impact statements introduce evi-
dence of harm that is unforeseeable and not clearly identified until
after the crime, and therefore is irrelevant to the jury's punishment
judgment. 55
The 6-3 decision in Payne, and the strong language contained in
the various concurring and dissenting opinions, reflect a sharp divi-
sion in the Court regarding the philosophical and legal justifications
for basing punishment judgments on harms that are subjective and,
arguably, unforeseen. Should judgments of a person's praiseworthi-
ness or blameworthiness for a given action depend on factors or con-
ditions that are beyond that person's control? In the next subpart we
argue that victim impact statements present a unique harm that war-
rants an analysis unlike that applied by the courts to more traditional
harms.
B. The Unique Nature of Victim Impact Statements
Victim impact statements describe harm that is at once highly
emotional, adventitious, and causally remote. The harm described by
victim impact statements is adventitious in the sense that in many
51 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825-26 (quoting Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
53 See id. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54 See id. at 859-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55 See id. at 861-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cases the victim's character and the nature of the reaction of the vic-
tim's family are facts that the defendant has no knowledge of at the
time of the crime. In addition, the harm described by victim impact
statements, while undoubtedly very real, is far down the causal chain
from the defendant's criminal act. For example, in capital sentencing
hearings after Payne, trial courts have admitted testimony from family
members concerning medical developments, such as heart attacks,
that they have experienced since the crime. 56 Other courts have ad-
mitted victim impact statements that describe how the crime has af-
fected relationships within the murder victim's extended family, such
as one statement that explained how the decedent's sister's marriage
suffered and ended in divorce.5 7 While most of the ill effects that are
now routinely admitted in capital cases are undoubtedly causally re-
lated to the crime, the causal relationship is, in some instances, quite
remote. This fact raises the question of how far down the causal chain
courts should be willing to go when deciding what kind of victim testi-
mony to admit in the penalty phase of a capital trial.5 8
The Payne Court held that, as a category of evidence, victim im-
pact statements are relevant to the jury's decision whether to impose
the death penalty. 59 Yet, relevance as an evidentiary matter does not
guarantee that the evidence will persuade the jury, and empirical evi-
dence on this question is sparse. Empirical investigations regarding
the link between magnitude of harm and severity of punishment typi-
cally have examined physical or otherwise objective harms sustained
by a victim (e.g., the type of physical injury sustained or the amount of
money stolen). 60 On the other hand, what makes victim impact state-
ments particularly intriguing for understanding the psychology of ret-
ribution is precisely what contributes to its controversial nature:
compared to other types of harms, emotional injuries are less quantifi-
able and necessitate subjective appraisals about their significance. 6' If
harm is expressed in the form of a victim's subjective, emotional reac-
tions to a crime, tension will exist between placing blame based on the
level of harm and recognizing that harm which is unforeseen, adventi-
tious, or causally remote might merit less blame. This tension is re-
flected in laypersons' intuitions about the factors that should be
56 For an excellent summary of these developments, see Logan, supra note 8, at
160-65.
57 Id. at 164.
58 The U.S. Supreme Court provided no guidance in Payne, and with a few excep-
tions, states have provided no limitations of their own. See id. at 151-53.
59 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
60 See, e.g., WHEELER ET AL., supra note 19 , at 66-68; Ugwuegbu & Hendrick, supra
note 31, at 77-78.
61 Elizabeth E. Joh argues that victim impact statements allow for the introduction of
pain as a sentencing factor, which encourages vengeance. See Elizabth E. Joh, Narrating
Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 19 (2000).
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considered in the determination of just punishments. Although the
psychology of punishment-the understanding of people's motives
and goals for responses to wrongdoing-has burgeoned within social
psychology in recent years,62 jury responses to victims are an under-
studied portion of the empirical literature. In the next Part, we dis-
cuss what we do know empirically about the influence of victim impact
statements on punishment judgments.
III
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE INFLUENCE OF SUBJECTIVE
EMOTIONAL HARM ON PUNISHMENT JUDGMENTS
A. Background: Previous Empirical Research
What do we know about the effects of subjective harms, such as
those expressed in victim impact statements, on culpability and pun-
ishment judgments? The existing body of work in this area is quite
limited, but appears to be consistent with the general principle that
victim impact statements which communicate greater harm produce
more severe punishmentjudgments, at least in controlled, experimen-
tal simulations. A handful of studies have examined victim impact evi-
dence in capital case simulations, although two of these studies
specifically avoided examining sentencing per se, reflecting the well-
grounded fear that a simulation would not adequately represent the
intensity of emotion in an actual death penalty sentencing hearing.63
Nonetheless, each of these studies is instructive. In both studies, the
researchers varied the victims' character and found that mock jurors
perceived the crime as more serious,64 and the survivors as having suf-
fered more psychological, physical, and financial harm, when the vic-
tim was portrayed in a more positive light.65
In a different study, undergraduate students acted as mock jurors
and made capital punishment decisions.66 The results of that study
showed that mock jurors were more likely to vote for a death sentence
when victim impact evidence was present rather than absent, and this
was especially true when the crime involved aggravating circum-
stances' 7 Another simulation using student mock jurors also found
increased recommendations for death sentences in the presence of a
62 See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 23, at 41-43.
63 See Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects onJurors'Judg-
ments, 5 PsyciioL. CRIME & L. 331, 338, 345 (1999); Greene et al., supra note 13, at 149-52.
64 Greene et al., supra note 13, at 154.
65 Greene, supra note 63, at 345 (comparing victim as photographer with victim as
motorcycle gang member).
66 See James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Triak
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JusT. 1 (1995).
67 Id. at 12-13.
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victim impact statement, but this was true only for post-deliberation
individual verdicts, not for mock jury group verdicts. 68
Experimental studies on the use and effect of victim impact state-
ments in noncapital cases are rare. In one study, researchers asked
Australian adults to read case files about a robbery or a rape, which
varied in their description of how well the victim was coping subse-
quent to the crime.69 Even though victim-coping is an adventitious
feature of the crime,70 subjects who read about a victim who was cop-
ing poorly were more punitive in sentencing than were subjects who
read about a victim who was coping well. 71 These results, however, are
difficult to interpret, because the method used in the study con-
founded the information source with the type of harm. When the
victim coped poorly, the prosecutor provided the victim information;
when the victim coped well, the defense provided the victim
information. 72
In another study, researchers presented mock jurors with a tran-
script of victim testimony interspersed with written descriptions of the
victim's emotional display.73 The results indicated that a strong emo-
tional display by the victim led observers to view the victim in a more
positive light, which in turn resulted in harsher punishment for the
defendant. 74 Interestingly, the study also found that emotional dis-
plays by the victim and by the defendant predicted subjects' impres-
sions of the original offense, which in turn also predicted punishment
judgments.7 5 This study, however, was limited to a great extent by its
use of undergraduates as mock jurors and by a rather impoverished
method of conveying information about the victim's emotional
display. 76
Although the preceding experimental studies suggest that adven-
titious harms can affect laypersons' views of appropriate sentences in
68 See Bryan Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the Verdicts
and SentencingJudgments of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REHIIABILITrION 95, 107-08 (1999).
69 See Adelma M. Hills & Donald M. Thomson, Should Victim Impact Influence Sentences?
Understanding the Community's Justice Reasoning, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 661, 663 (1999).
70 Hills and Thomson preceded us in examining the adventitious nature of victim
impact evidence, although they used the term "fortuitous consequences." Id. at 662.
71 See id. at 669.
72 See id. at 664-65.
73 See Olga Tsoudis & Lynn Smith-Lovin, How Bad Was It? The Effects of Victim and
Perpetrator Emotion on Responses to Criminal Court Vignettes, 77 Soc. FORCES 695, 704-05
(1998). For example, in one version of the victim testimony, subjects were presented with
a written description that said "I didn't know what to do (weeping, one hand on face)." Id.
at 705.
74 See id. at 709-10.
75 Id. at 710-11.
76 See id. at 704-05.
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
both capital and noncapital simulation contexts,77 each study contains
factors that make it difficult to assert this proposition without reserva-
tion. The studies involving capital cases either had mixed results78 or
opted not to examine sentencing at all.79 The studies involving non-
capital crimes described emotional harm in confounded 0 or prob-
lematic ways.81
In order to further examine the question of emotional harm as a
factor in punishment judgments, we designed a simple experiment.
In this experiment, we randomly assigned participants to three
groups. The only difference between the three groups was the
description of the severity of the victim's emotional response to the
crime. Because capital sentencing is a complicated punishment deci-
sion that is very difficult to simulate both procedurally and emotion-
ally, we opted to study the effects of victim impact statements on
relatively common types of crimes.
In the subpart that follows, we describe the methodology and pre-
sent the results from our initial study of the effect of victims' emo-
tional suffering on laypersons' judgments about criminal punishment.
Specifically, this study tests the hypothesis that the severity of emo-
tional harm described by a victim in a criminal proceeding is directly
related to the severity of the sentence imposed on the defendant.
B. The Current Study
1. Participants and Procedure
Three hundred and two adults volunteered to participate in the
study.8 2 Participants were recruited to fill out a brief questionnaire
during the lunch hour in the lobby of a busy university administration
77 In contrast to the laboratory studies discussed above, studies examining real cases
have found that victim impact statements have mixed or no effects on sentencing. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact Statements on Sentencing Deci-
sions: A Test in an Urban Setting, II JUST. Q. 453, 464-65 (1994) (finding no effect); Edna
Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sentence Out-
come, 28 CRIMINOLOc.Y 451, 467-69 (1990) (finding an effect on sentence outcomes when
comparing probation versus incarceration sentencing, but not for sentence length). There
are a number of different explanations accounting for the mixed results of these two stud-
ies, including the different geographical locations of the courts studied, the distribution of
the crimes and victims, the differences in local practices, and the fact that researchers
included in the samples cases that had been disposed of through plea bargain. Further,
unlike experimental research, potentially confounding factors across cases cannot be
controlled.
78 See Luginbuhl & Burkhead, supra note 66, at 12-13; Myers & Arbuthnot, supra note
68, at 107-08.
79 See Greene, supra note 63, at 338, 345; Greene et al., supra note 13, at 149-52.
80 See Hills & Thomson, supra note 69, at 664-65.
81 See Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, supra note 73, at 704-05.
82 In exchange for agreeing to fill out the questionnaire, participants were offered a
chocolate chip cookie.
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building in downtown Chicago.8 3 Participants varied widely along va-
rious demographic features. Only 36% of the participants were stu-
dents; 84 the remaining participants worked in nearby offices or were
members of the public who happened to be passing through the
lobby. Thirty-three percent of the participants were ages 18-25, 33%
were ages 26-35, 17% were ages 36-45, 10% were ages 46-55, and 3%
were over age 55. Approximately 20% of the participants were Afri-
can-American or Black, 5% were Latino, 50% were White, and 17%
were Asian. Fifty-seven percent of the participants were women.
The two-page questionnaire took approximately three to five min-
utes to complete. In it, we asked participants to read a brief vignette
describing a crime, and then to respond to the questions that fol-
lowed.85 Participants were advised that their answers were completely
anonymous, and that we would not be asking for their names.
2. Materials and Design
We tested participants' reactions to one of two 8 6 different crimes:
each participant read either a burglary (208 participants) or a robbery
(94 participants) vignette. 87 Within each crime, we randomly as-
signed participants to read one of three different victim impact state-
ments. 88  We did not tell the participants that there were three
different victim statements. Rather, each participant read and made
judgments about only one version of the crime.8" Participants receiv-
ing the Severe Emotional Injury statement read that, as a result of the
crime, the victim is now feeling afraid, vulnerable, depressed, is hav-
ing problems sleeping, and cannot stop thinking about the crime. In
the Mild Emotional Injury statement, participants read that the victim
83 The building houses administrative offices, a bookstore, a cafeteria, and a dormi-
tory, and is also a pickup point for physical rehabilitation patients. The building's lobby is
also a popular walk-through area for many area lunch spots.
84 These participants were almost exclusively medical students. Law students, law
professors, and lawyers were not allowed to participate.
85 Note that although participants essentially acted as mock jurors, limitations on time
and the experimental setting did not permit group deliberations as mock juries. Caution
must be used in generalizing the individual questionnaire responses in this study to predic-
tions about the behavior ofjuries, because differences between decisions of individuals and
decisions of groups vary in ways that are difficult to predict. See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr et al.,
Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687 (1996).
86 The vignettes for the two different crimes are reproduced in the Appendix.
87 We initially administered the burglary vignette to 208 participants. To ensure that
the effects would generalize to other crimes, we then administered the robbery vignette to
a smaller sample of 94 participants.
88 The three different versions of the victim impact statements are reproduced in the
Appendix. The only difference between the vignettes is the type of information presented
about the emotional impact of the crime.
89 In other words, we employed a between-subjects design in which the sole indepen-
dent variable had three levels: Severe Emotional Injury, Mild Emotional Injury, and
Control.
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was angry when the crime first happened, but now has returned to her
normal activities and no longer thinks too much about the crime. Fi-
nally, in the Control condition, participants received no information
about how the victim was coping with the crime.
The Control condition allows us to compare the average sentence
judgment when no victim impact information is present to the aver-
age sentence judgment when victim impact evidence is present. If
sentencing judgments are, indeed, influenced by the adventitious
harm presented in victim impact statements, we would expect differ-
ences in sentence judgments across all three groups. That is, com-
pared to the Control condition, we expect that evidence of a victim's
Severe Emotional Injury would lead participants to render particularly
punitive sentences, whereas evidence of a victim's relatively Mild Emo-
tional Injury would yield comparatively lighter sentences. The degree
of adventitious harm would be a less reliable indicator of the severity
of punishment judgments if, compared to the Control condition, sen-
tence judgments increase when any victim impact information is
presented. This result would suggest that mere victim-focus, rather
than extent of harm, is the key variable in the relationship between
victim impact testimony and sentence judgments.
After reading the crime vignette (and victim statement, if any),
participants were asked to indicate what prison sentence, if any, the
defendant should receive for the crime. Participants responded on a
scale that ranged from "Probation (No Prison)" on one end to "18
years or more" on the other end.1) Participants then answered a num-
ber of other questions regarding their opinions as to the seriousness
of the crime and the extent of injury to the victim, as well as demo-
graphic questions about themselves.
3. Results
We first examined whether the victim impact statement in the
Severe Emotional Injury version of the questionnaire was, in fact, per-
ceived by the participants as describing a more severe harm than that
represented in the Mild Emotional Injury version of the question-
naire. Indeed, this was the case for both the burglary and the robbery
vignette. Participants were asked to rate, in their own opinion, how
upset the victim was on a scale from 1 to 7. Participants who read the
victim impact statement describing Severe Emotional Injury rated the
victim as significantly9' more upset, on average, than participants who
90 Although the scale was marked with three-year increments, participants were in-
structed to indicate their opinion by marking an "X" anywhere on the scale. Thus, partici-
pants could recommend sentences that fell in between the three-year increments.
9I Throughout this Article, "significantly" refers to statistical significance, which de-
notes the rejection of the null hypothesis-the possibility of no differences between the
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read the Mild Emotional Injury statement, for both burglary92 and
robbery.93 On this question, the victim in the Control version of the
questionnaire was rated as being, on average, between the Severe and
Mild responses for both crimes.9 4 Thus, we successfully manipulated
the severity of emotional harm.95
We then examined our main question of interest, namely
whether the emotional severity of victim impact evidence influenced
the severity of sentences imposed on defendants. Our results indeed
demonstrate such an effect of victim impact evidence on severity of
sentence. In the burglary vignette, participants chose a higher prison
term, on average, when the victim impact evidence described Severe
Emotional Injury (4.4 years) than when it described Mild Emotional
Injury (2.7 years). 9 6  In the robbery vignette, a similar pattern
emerged: participants assigned more severe sentences, on average,
when the victim impact statement expressed Severe Emotional Injury
(4.8 years) than when the victim impact statement expressed Mild
Emotional Injury (3.1 years). 97
Participants were also asked about their own emotional reactions
to the crime. Specifically, they were asked to indicate on a scale from
1 to 7 the degree to which they felt sympathy, anger, and disgust while
reading about the crime. We hypothesized that the expression of se-
vere emotional harms in the victim impact statements would lead
mock jurors to experience more intense emotions themselves. The
results indicate that this was true at least of participants' feelings of
sympathy. For the burglary vignette, participants rated their own feel-
ings of sympathy higher, on average, when the victim impact evidence
described Severe Emotional Injury (mean = 5.12) than when it de-
various groups-at a probability of less than 5%. Thus, "p" is defined as the probability of
finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there
were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them.
92 Severe mean = 5.83; Mild mean = 3.43. t (132) = 11.47; p < .001.
9-' Severe mean = 6.16; Mild mean = 3.00. t (61) = 12.40; p < .001.
94 Burglary: Control mean = 4.97. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed signifi-
cant overall differences: F(2, 203) = 53.62; p< .001. Robbery: Control mean = 5.20; overall
F (2, 90) = 61.02; p < .001.
95 In experimental psychology, this analysis is called a "manipulation check." This
check ensures that the participants correctly perceive the variations in the severity of the
harms. If participants did not correctly perceive these variations, any differences in the
resulting sentences could not be plausibly related to differences in severity of injuries.
96 t (121) = 2.81; p< .01; the Control mean did not differ significantly from the Severe
mean (Control = 4.2 years). An ANOVA revealed a significant difference across all three
conditions. F (2, 191) = 3.66; p < .05.
97 t (60) = 2.49; p < .05; the Control mean did not differ significantly from the Severe
mean (Control = 4.3 years). An ANOVA revealed a marginally significant difference across
all three conditions. F (2, 89) = 3.07; p = .052.
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scribed Mild Emotional Injury (mean = 4.22).98 For the robbery
vignette, the same pattern emerged, although the overall differences
were only marginally statistically significant. 99 There were no signifi-
cant differences in participants' reported experience of feelings of dis-
gust or anger based on the severity of victim impact statements. 0 0
Finally, participants were asked to rate the seriousness of the crime on
a scale from I (not serious) to 7 (extremely serious). Although the
average rating of crime seriousness was not significantly different
based on the severity of victim impact statements,"" the percentage of
participants rating the crime as very serious (indicated by a rating of 6
or 7) was significantly greater when victim impact statements were Se-
vere (15%) than when they were Mild (3.5%).102
These data show that as the victim describes increasingly severe
emotional harm, the sentence imposed on the defendant likewise in-
creases.10 3 Laypersons (and perhaps judges as well) 104 are more puni-
tive when the outcome of the crime reflects greater emotional harm
to the victim. Even when all other circumstances surrounding the
crime and the defendant are held constant, the punishment is more
severe when the victim is psychologically less able to deal with the
crime in its aftermath. In addition, the defendant who had the "luck"
of committing his crime on a victim who coped well benefited from a
shorter sentence, as compared with the Control vignette. Thus, pun-
ishment tracked the adventitious harm described in the different
vignettes.
98 t (89) = 2.84; p < .01; the Control mean did not differ significantly from the Severe
mean (Control = 4.94). An ANOVA revealed a marginally significant difference across all
three conditions. F (2, 135) = 4.14; p = .05.
99 F (2, 90) = 2.42; p = .095. Means: Severe = 5.28; Mild = 4.77; Control = 4.53.
10o All IFs < 1.
101 All Fs =1.
102 X (1) = 4.79; p < .05. Thus, although the severity of the victim's emotional injury
did not have an observable overall effect on judgments about the seriousness of the crime,
emotional injury did appear to influence some participants who were inclined to think that
the crime was extremely serious.
103 The sample consisted of laypersons, not judges. It is an open question whether
judges imposing a sentence in a noncapital case would be similarly affected by different
levels of emotional harm expressed in victim impact statements. However, evidence exists
that judges, despite their training and expertise, rely on the same decision-making
processes as laypersons, making them vulnerable to systematic mental shortcuts. See, e.g.,
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). The sampling
of laypersons (as opposed to judges) in this experiment is directly relevant in states in
which juries are involved in sentencing. There are several states in which juries have the
power to sentence in noncapital cases, although in some of these states, the jury's power is
limited. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-103, 16-90-107 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2000); OKLA.
STrAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 926-928 (West 1986 & Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-20-104,
40-20-107 (1997); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 2000 & Stipp. 2002).
104 See Guthrie et al., supra note 103.
[Vol. 88:419
VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY
But does the fact that people take this adventitious harm into ac-
count when making punishment judgments mean that we should give
these intuitions credence? It is a separate question whether and to
what extent the emotional reaction of the victim should influence
punishment judgments. The answer to this question depends, in part,
on the psychology of punishment. If the psychological mechanism by
which emotional victim impact influences punishment judgments
serves a useful social function, or is recognized as socially desirable,
then this conclusion might constitute a reason to defer to popular
intuitions. On the other hand, if the jury's consideration of emo-
tional impact on victims is recognized as socially undesirable, there
may be a reason to limit or even eliminate the sentencing authority's
reliance on such evidence. In the next Part, we discuss several social
psychological mechanisms underlying the influence of victim impact
evidence on punishment judgments. For each social psychological
mechanism we discuss, we argue that there is cause for concern that
victim impact statements produce punishment judgments that are less
reliable than they would be in the absence of such evidence. In the
Conclusion of this Article, we make recommendations for limiting the
use of victim impact statements based on the analysis in Part IV.
IV
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE
INFLUENCE OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE ON
PUNISHMENT JUDGMENTS
A. Outcome Bias: Emotional Harm as a Heuristic for Culpability
Evidence about the emotional impact of a crime on the victim or
the victim's survivors is by nature subjective and more difficult to
quantify than objective physical or financial harms. Such evidence is
also by nature unforeseeable, because no one can predict the emo-
tional impact that a crime will have on the victim and others. Despite
its subjective and unforeseeable nature, people support the use of vic-
tim impact statements. 10 5 Moreover, as shown in Part III, victim im-
pact statements do influence decisions about punishment. In this
subpart, we argue that in cases in which culpability and punishment
judgments are informed by adventitious results (such as emotional
harms described in victim impact statements), those judgments are
likely to be unduly influenced by knowledge of the adventitious out-
come. Before addressing the argument that victim impact statements
are a source of outcome bias, we first address adventitious harm gen-
105 See Greene, supra note 63, at 333 (noting that some proponents of victim impact
evidence argue that harm to victims "is directly relevant to gauging the severity of the
crime and the appropriate punishment").
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erally, and why victim impact statements are an especially unreliable
species of adventitious harm.
Recall that the criminal law tracks popular intuitions about the
role of harm, even when harm is adventitious. For example, the suc-
cessful assassin is punished more harshly than the unsuccessful
assassin. 116 From the philosophical perspective of retribution, it is not
immediately obvious why we would draw such a distinction, given that,
in both instances, the offender performed the very same act with the
very same mental state. And because we know that, as an empirical
matter, people are retributivists who are motivated to base punish-
mentjudgments on moral culpability," 7 it is not clear why people pre-
fer harsher punishments solely on the basis of adventitious outcomes.
That is, why do commonsense judgments of blame and punishment
take into account harm that is produced by chance factors? This ques-
tion is especially puzzling with respect to subjective, emotional harms
of the type witnessed in victim impact statements. This question is
best illustrated with an example: 08
Case A: A driver recklessly drives through a red light at a busy inter-
section. There are numerous pedestrians present. By chance, no
pedestrians happen to be in the car's path, and no one is hurt.
As Adam Smith observed with regard to the stone-throwing exam-
ple, most people would be shocked if this driver received a severe pun-
ishment, such as a lengthy prison term.""' In essence, people reason
that because there was no harm, there is no foul.
Case B: The same driver driving the same car through the same in-
tersection commits the exact same act (drives through the red light)
with the exact same reckless state of mind. As before, there are nu-
merous pedestrians present. But in this case, the driver hits and
kills four pedestrians who happen to be crossing the street.
In Case B, most people would not be particularly shocked to hear
that the driver received a lengthy prison term. For the purposes of
this example, we can assume that everything about the two situations
is exactly the same except for the outcome, which is based on chance
factors. When asked to evaluate moral blame and assess punishment,
1063 See supra notes 5, 51 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
108 The example is similar to the one given by Justice White in his dissenting opinion
in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 516 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). The fact that a
person may be subject to praise or blame based on an outcome caused by fortuitous cir-
cumstances is termed "moral luck," and has been discussed at length by moral philoso-
phers. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONs 24-38 (1979).
109 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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we severely blame and punish B and do not blame or punish A.
Why? 1 o
One possible psychological explanation for our strong intuitive
sense that harm matters (even if adventitious) is that the outcome of
an act serves as a heuristic for the actor's effort and other factors that
are difficult to ascertain.' I' The social world is filled with uncertain-
ties, and it is impossible to recognize every relevant detail of a com-
plex social event, such as a criminal homicide. In the example above,
we do not know what the driver was thinking at the time of the reck-
less act, and why he ended up driving through the red light. Did he
take his eyes off the road? If so, why? Or did he misjudge the distance
between his car and the intersection and try to make it through the
yellow light? Or did he know that the light would be red when he
went through it but sped up and hoped for the best? Given the well-
documented limitations of first-person report,11 2 the driver's exact
motivations and mental state cannot be determined with any cer-
tainty. We cannot know much more than this: a car went through a
red light, and people either were or were not hurt. We can certainly
infer from this evidence important relevant factors such as the driver's
state of mind. But such inferences do not provide reliability. In con-
ditions filled with this much uncertainty, harm can be an indicator for
what really occurred. In this sense, outcome is a proxy for the defen-
dant's state of mind, motive, and ultimately, his culpability and deserv-
ingness of punishment. Harm is a heuristic that helps us interpret
what happened in the absence of better information. 313
Empirical support exists for the theory that harm serves as a heu-
ristic by helping us fill in the blanks regarding unknown factors about
110 A number of criminal law theorists have argued that our intuitions are simply mis-
taken, and that punishment should not depend on moral luck. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg,
Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIz. L.
REV. 117, 118-19 (1995) (proposing the elimination of "the causal condition in the defini-
tion of all so-called completed crimes"); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and
the Luck of the Draw, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679-81 (1994) (arguing that the
"harm doctrine" is not rationally supportable because it "does not serve the crime preven-
tive purposes of the criminal law, and is not redeemed by any defensible normative princi-
ple"). Thus, a person who attempts but fails to complete a crime deserves the very same
punishment as the person who successfully completes the same crime. In contrast,
Michael Moore and others adopt a version of retributivism that takes harm into account
(even harm that is fortuitous) in gauging culpability and punishment. See MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 191-247 (1997). Moore
calls this a "moral luck" form of retributivism. Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A
Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 65, 66 (1999).
111 See Gail L. Heriot, The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the Law of Tort, 5
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 145-47 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of
Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. REv. 879, 887-88 (2000).
112 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know:
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231, 231-32 (1977).
113 See Heriot, supra note 111, at 147; Moore, supra note 110, at 85-88.
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the crime. In a study that tested memory for eyewitness events, Eliza-
beth Loftus found that eyewitness memory of the details of a video-
taped car accident varied with the severity of the crash (as
characterized by lawyers' leading questions).' 14 For example, eyewit-
nesses estimated that the car involved in the accident was traveling at
faster speeds, and they were more likely to report having seen broken
glass (although there was none) if the car was described as having
"smashed" the other car (as opposed to having "contacted" it). 1 15
Generally, when harm seems severe, we infer that the causal factors
associated with the harm are also severe. In the context of victim im-
pact statements, Edith Greene and her colleagues found that when
murder victims were presented as more respectable, mock jurors per-
ceived the victim's survivors as suffering more, and the crime in ques-
tion as more severe, than when murder victims were presented as less
respectable. 116 These studies illustrate that the severity of the harm
shapes inferences about the severity of the causes of that harm.
Professor Larry Alexander has suggested that despite our intu-
itions to the contrary, the criminal law should focus solely on the cul-
pable act (actus reus + mens rea), to the complete exclusion of social
harm."17 It is not clear, however, that a sentencer can mentally sepa-
rate the culpable act from the social harm. Upon learning the extent
of the harm, the sentencer uses this information, consciously or un-
consciously, as a basis for judgment. The assessment of the culpable
act (i.e., how responsible was the defendant for what happened) is
driven by the extent and nature of the social harm. Consequently,
there exists a "severity-dependent attribution" of responsibility-the
more severe the outcome, the more responsible the defendant seems,
even if all other factors are held constant.' 18 This concept is best illus-
trated by a study discussed above, in which respondents rated the re-
sponsibility of a bank robber who had aimed and fired his gun at a
bank teller but accidentally hit a customer.)' 9 In one version of the
story, the harm to the customer was quite mild (the bullet only grazed
114 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between. Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 585, 588 (1974).
115 See id.
116 Greene et al., supra note 13, at 154; see also Mark D. Alicke & Teresa L. Davis, The
Role of a Posteriori Victim Information in Judgments of Blame and Sanction, 25J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 362, 374 (1989) (finding that mock jurors punished the defendant more
severely when the victim was characterized as "innocent" than when the victim turned out
to be a dangerous criminal, even though the defendant had no information about the
victim at the time of the incident).
117 See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1-3
(1994).
118 See Ugwuegbu & Hendrick, supra note 31, at 76.
119 See id. at 78-79.
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him), while in the other version, the harm was more severe (the bullet
paralyzed him). 120 Participants rated the defendant as more responsi-
ble for the incident when the customer suffered paralysis than when
he only suffered minor injuries. 121 It is therefore problematic to say
that the criminal law should worry only about the culpability of the
act, because sentencing decisions made by applying criminal law prin-
ciples are unavoidably colored by the severity of the harm.
The fact that severity of harm molds our inferences about the
cause of the harm might explain why many people felt that a severe
sentence was well deserved in the recent case of the Boston father who
killed another father in a fist-fight at their kids' hockey game. 122 The
defendant, Thomas Junta, received a sentence of six to ten years of
imprisonment, a punishment that many considered to be harsh, given
that the degree of criminal homicide for which he was convicted was
involuntary manslaughter. 123 But at the same time, the public largely
regarded the sentence as just. Why? The harm-as-heuristic theory
suggests that it is because of the severity of the harm that resulted
from the father's crime. Fist-fighting is conduct that normally does
not lead to great harm, and for this reason does not often lead to
harsh punishment. According to the harm-as-heuristic model, popu-
lar intuition demands harsh punishment for Junta because the result
of his crime-death-serves as a rule of thumb that allows us to make
inferences about the culpability of the act. Specifically, the severe
harm to the victim gives rise to the inference that the act was truly
dangerous and reckless. Then, based on the heightened culpability of
the act, we punish harshly. Accordingly, we would punish another de-
fendant involved in a fist-fight less harshly if the resulting harm were
much less, because the recklessness of the act would be uncertain
without firm evidence of the harm. Though operating as a heuristic,
people view harm as much more than a rough estimate: harm pro-
vides strong evidence of the severity of the crime.
But how reliable is harm as evidence of culpability? At this point,
it is useful to examine whether some types of harm might be more
reliable indicators of the general culpability of a defendant than
others. In particular, victim impact statements describe a type of
harm that is particularly unreliable as a heuristic regarding unknown
factors related to culpability. To understand why, let us first consider
physical harm, which is a standard feature of the prosecution's case
during the guilt phase of a trial. In most cases, the extent of physical
120 See id. at 79.
121 See id. at 84.
122 See Ed Hayward, Lessons of Rink-Rage Case Touch All in Youth Sports, BOSTON HERALD,
Jan. 26, 2002, at 5.
123 See id.
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harm that a victim suffers is a relatively reliable indicator of factors
related to culpability, as illustrated by the Junta case discussed above.
Few morphologically important individual differences are likely to ex-
ist between persons that would leave one person dead and the next
person unscathed following the very same act. That is, regardless of
who the victim is, the extent of bodily injury reveals a great deal about
the act that led to the injury. 124 However, unlike physical harm, emo-
tional harm is a particularly unreliable heuristic, because individual
emotional responses to a crime vary widely among individuals. In ad-
dition to the wide range of potential emotional reactions, how effec-
tively victims and survivors express their experiences in court is likely
to vary broadly. 125 That is, unlike physical injury, the severity of emo-
tional injury permits few reliable inferences about the act that led to
the injury, because victims vary widely on how they respond and ex-
press themselves emotionally to the same crime. Thus, although it
may be intuitively compelling to punish offenders more harshly when
the resultant emotional harm is more severe, this intuition probably
derives from the general proposition that harm is a reliable in'licator
of defendant culpability. In the case of emotional harm, however, the
severity of such harm might not be a reliable indicator of defendant
culpability. In applying the general principle that harm is a good indi-
cation of culpability, we fail to discount for the unreliability of emo-
tional harm.
Evidence suggests that people are susceptible to outcome bias.
That is, people evaluate a decision or other action more favorably
when the outcome is positive than when it is negative, to a greater
extent than is warranted by the available information. 12 6 For exam-
ple, when people were asked to judge medical decisions (using the
same information available to the doctor at the time), they blamed
the doctor more harshly and labeled her less competent when the
outcome was unfavorable than when it was favorable. 127 In essence,
people take into account information about the outcome of an event
when judging the person who caused it, even when the outcome is not
a reliable basis for judging. As we have argued, compared to other
124 There is, of course, the familiar example of the victim who has an "eggshell skull."
See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
52, 56 (1999) (noting that under the "eggshell skull" doctrine, "a defendant is liable for
the unexpected and even unforeseeable consequences to the particular plaintiff'). But the
frequency in the population of such victims is likely to be exceedingly low, making the
physical harm heuristic reliable most of the time.
125 The Supreme Court raised this concern in Booth v. Mmyland, 482 U.S. 496, 505-06
(1987), andJustice Marshall also discussed the issue in his dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 846 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 See, e.g.,Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. Psyci-ioL. 569, 569-70 (1988).
127 See id. at 571-72.
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types of harm resulting from a crime, such as physical harm, the emo-
tional harm contained in victim impact statements is not a reliable
proxy for judging relevant but unknown circumstances of the crime,
such as the defendant's state of mind. Yet, we are drawn to outcome
information even when we are aware of its unreliability. In the afore-
mentioned study in which participants judged a doctor's medical deci-
sion, most participants recognized that they should not consider
outcomes in their evaluations. 128 Despite knowing that outcome in-
formation was not a reliable tool in evaluating the doctor's decision,
they used outcome information nonetheless. 129 Similarly, jurors hear-
ing victim impact statements might recognize that the information is
an unreliable heuristic for judging the unknown circumstances sur-
rounding the crime. Because of people's general susceptibility to us-
ing outcome information in judging behavior, however, jurors are
likely to be unduly influenced by victim impact statements.
B. Decision-Maker Emotion
Up to this point we have focused on cognitive social psychological
processes that help to explain why people generally support allowing
the sentencer to consider victim emotional harm, as well as how evi-
dence of such harm influences decisions about punishment. To focus
exclusively on cognitive processes would be to ignore one of the main
concerns expressed in the Payne dissenting opinions and in subse-
quent scholarly commentary: victim impact statements might arouse
intense emotions that overwhelm the capital sentencing decision pro-
cess. 13° These concerns explicitly reflect an assumption that the pres-
ence of emotion in legal decision making is anathema to careful
reasoning. In fact, although the precise relationship between emo-
tional and cognitive processes is both complex and controversial,' 31
psychological research has uncovered several ways that emotions can
affect decision making.
First, anger is a punitive emotion: people who are angry in reac-
tion to hearing about a crime are motivated to call for greater punish-
ment for that crime.' -2 Indeed, in a very general sense, the
experience of anger is accompanied by a desire to attack,' 33 an in-
128 Id. at 577.
129 Id.
1301 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing Justice Stevens's dissent in
Payne); supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly criticism of the use of
victim impact statements).
131 See, e.g., Richard S. Lazarus, The Cognition-Emotion Debate: A Bit of History, in HAND-
BOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 3, 3 (Tim Dalgleish & MickJ. Power eds., 1999).
132 See Graham et al., supra note 21, at 341 (discussing the results of an empirical
study).
133 In emotions literature, this desire is referred to as an "action tendency." RICHARD
S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 226 (1991).
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stinct that is easily translated into a desire for punishment. Thus, to
the extent that the sentencer's anger toward the defendant is evoked
or exacerbated by victim impact statements, we would expect
sentencers to prefer harsher punishment judgments.
Second, the very demonstration of negative emotions can alter
people's explanations for why an event happened. For example, peo-
ple who were induced in an experimental setting to feel anger were
more likely to blame individual persons for negative outcomes (e.g.,
an arsonist is to blame for a house fire) than they were to blame im-
personal forces, such as bad luck (e.g., an electrical shortage is to
blame for a house fire). 1 34 Anger has this effect because the emotion
tends to come about, in the first instance, through the recognition
that another person has done something to harm us, or has harmed
someone with whom we sympathize.1 3 5 Once this focus on individual
accountability emerges, it is more salient and readily available when
we assess other situations. 13 6 For example, people who were induced
in an experimental setting to feel anger were later asked to assess a
completely unrelated tort case. Angry people awarded more damages
to the tort plaintiff andjudged the defendant to be more deserving of
punishment than people who were not angry at the time, even though
the anger was unrelated to the tort case.' 37
One explanation for the anger-punishment relationship is that
exposure to intense emotional suffering heightens decision makers'
negative affect and consequently activates "blame-validation process-
ing." 138 In this state, jurors or other decision makers look for ways to
hold an offender responsible, even for unforeseeable outcomes.' 39 In
response to these negative feelings, people rationalize greater blame
for an event-and presumably, concomitant levels of punishment-by
altering their evidentiary standards. 41 According to the blame-valida-
tion model, evidence that a victim or a family member of a victim has
suffered severe emotional injury is not only likely to arouse a decision
maker's desire to blame, but will also produce a cognitive search to
S34 See Dacher Keltner et al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social
Perception, 64J. PERSONALITV & Soc. PSN'CbOL. 740, 750-51 (1993).
135 See Craig A. Smith & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion,
48J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 813, 833 (1985).
136 See Keltner et al., supra note 134, at 751.
137 See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger,
and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
563, 570 (1998).
138 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psycholog of Blame, 126 Ps\'CH-1OL. BULL.
556, 568 (2000).
139 See id.
140 See id. at 566.
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validate that blame.1 4 1 In short, the anger aroused by hearing victim
impact statements often induces decision makers to engage in a
search for evidence to support more blame and punishment.142 Ac-
cordingly, despite the fact that the Payne Court reasoned that victim
impact statements help restore the balance between defendant and
victim,1 43 there is reason to suppose that victim impact statements fur-
ther tip the scales against a defendant.
There is additional evidence to suggest that victim impact state-
ments generate negative affect within the decision maker, and there-
fore lead to a higher likelihood that the decision maker will search for
reasons to blame and punish. Recent research on the "moral emo-
tions" identifies contempt, anger, and disgust as three key responses
to wrongdoing by others. 144 Victim impact statements plausibly acti-
vate each of these emotions. As previously mentioned, anger might
arise through the recognition that someone else is responsible for
harm that has befallen another or ourselves.1 45 One scholar charac-
terizes this anger as arising through "violations of autonomy."'146 In
other words, anger occurs in response to perceived violations of a per-
son's rights or to his well-being.1 47 Sentencers naturally perceive the
crime itself as a violation of the victim's autonomy, and this percep-
tion is likely to elicit anger. By focusing on the continuing emotional
impact of the crime, victim impact statements indicate that the viola-
141 This is a well known phenomenon in cognitive psychology in which decision mak-
ers search for confirming information rather than disconfirming information. See, e.g.,
P.C. WASON & P.N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING: STRUCTURE AND CON-
TENT 202-17 (1972). This phenomenon has come to be known as "confirmation bias."
Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothe-
sis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 211 (1987). The blame-validation hypothesis holds that a
negative affective reaction to a situation-termed a "spontaneous evaluation "-leads peo-
ple to engage in a biased search for information. See Alicke, supra note 138, at 564-66.
142 Empirical evidence supports the notion that jurors seek evidence to confirm judg-
ments they may have made earlier in the case. In one study, mock jurors read evidence
from a criminal case, loosely based on the Bernard Goetz case, in which researchers por-
trayed four young men who were victims of a shooting on a subway as either gang members
or star athletes. See Alicke, supra note 138, at 567. Mock jurors were told that they could
hear from only three of four witnesses before making their decision about the defendant's
guilt, and they were asked to choose which witnesses they would hear from. Id. Two of the
witnesses were pro-prosecution and the other two were pro-defense. Id. Mock jurors who
learned that the victims were star athletes chose to hear from the prosecution witnesses
more often than mock jurors who were told that the victims were gang members. Id. Mock
jurors, having already decided how severely to punish the defendant early in the case,
sought out the kind of evidence that would confirm the judgment they had previously
made. See id.
143 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
144 See Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emo-
tions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 574-76, 585 (1999).
145 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146 Rozin et al., supra note 144, at 576.
147 See id.
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tion of autonomy inherent in the crime continues, but in a different
form (i.e., by impairing the well-being of the victim's family and
friends). This perception of a continuing violation of autonomy is
likely to further increase anger in decision makers, and is likely to be
associated with more severe punishment.
Apart from anger, victim impact statements are likely to elicit
other negative emotions in the sentencer. Contempt-a weaker emo-
tion than anger, but still linked with negative arousal-often arises in
response to violations of the ethics of community. 148 Harms to com-
munity include violations generally considered less serious in our cul-
ture than crimes, such as disrespect for authority or for institutions. 1
49
The empirically established connection between contempt and com-
munity harm is particularly critical for the role of victim impact state-
ments in capital trials, given that in some jurisdictions courts routinely
address evidence about how the victim's death has affected the com-
munity. 151 Whether contempt arising from community harm influ-
ences punishment judgments is still an open question that has not
been resolved empirically. But it is worth noting that victim impact
statements often focus attention not only on the harm to the individ-
ual victim and individual family members and friends, but also on the
way in which the crime has affected a larger social group. 15 1 In short,
there are several ways that negative emotions directed at the defen-
dant can lead to more blame, a change in evidentiary standards, and
ultimately more punishment.
Finally, apart from engendering anger toward the defendant, an-
other way that victim impact statements might influence sentencing
decisions is through the decision maker's sympathy for the victim.
People who feel sympathy for someone's plight will likely be motivated
to help that person.' 52 Therefore, to the extent that decision makers
believe that assigning harsher punishment to an offender will help the
victim, and will relieve the distress of family members and friends, the
victim's or family's story that elicits greater sympathy should also elicit
more severe punishment. Similarly, to the extent that decision mak-
ers perceive punishment as "helpful" to the victim's family by putting
themselves in the family's position and asking what they would want in
148 See id. at 575-76.
149 See id.
15o See Logan, supra note 8, at 161-62; Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing:
Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187 (1995).
151 See Logan, supra note 8, at 153-56.
152 Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFEcTIVE SCIENCES (R.J. Da-
vidson et al. eds., forthcoming 2002), available at http://wsrv.clas.virgiia.edu/-jdh6n/
themoralemotions.html.
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that situation, decision makers are likely to assume that the family
would want the harshest possible punishment for the defendant. 153
A particularly intriguing aspect of the role of sympathy in punish-
mentjudgments is that the emotional intensity of witnesses giving vic-
tim impact testimony is perceived by observers as a cry for help or
relief. The decision maker has at her disposal the power to punish
the offender and the power to decide the severity of the punishment.
In this way, the emotion expressed by the victim becomes a covert
communication about the victim's, or the victim's family's, desire for
retribution. Consequently, this expression obviates the Payne Court's
prohibition of victim opinion testimony regarding appropriate pun-
ishment. 154 Through the implicit evocation of sympathy, the victim
can communicate his or her wishes for severe punishment.
Our data support a link between sympathy for a victim and levels
of punishment. Interestingly, the results highlight the extent to which
chance factors can affect punishment decisions, for it was the failure
on the part of the victim expressing mild emotional harm to elicit
sympathy among participants in our study that was associated with less
punishment. Subjects exposed to a victim's mild emotional harm re-
ported less sympathy for the victim-who was, after all, coping quite
well-and recommended less punishment for the offender.1 55 This
resilient victim was perceived as not needing the help that could be
offered through punishment. Accordingly, subjects believed that the
defendant deserved less punishment.
Now imagine the reverse situation in the context of a capital sen-
tencing hearing: intensely emotional victim impact statements pro-
vided by family, friends, and neighbors, describing the exemplary
character of the victim who is now gone forever and the painful emo-
tional toll on the survivors, evoke sympathy to such an extent that it
becomes more probable that the jury will perceive death as the most
appropriate punishment. In either event, the emotional nature of vic-
tim impact statements makes real the very danger that the Court wor-
ried about in Booth: "defendants whose victims were assets to their
community are more deserving of punishment than those whose vic-
tims are perceived to be less worthy."156 In overruling Booth, the Payne
majority dismissed this danger by declaring that "victim impact evi-
dence is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of this
153 For a similar argument, see Luginbuhl & Burkhead, supra note 66, at 5-6 (noting
that jurors may perceive imposing severe punishment as an indirect way of helping the
victim's family).
154 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991) (noting that Payne did not
affect the Court's holding in Booth that the admission of a victim's family member's opin-
ion regarding the appropriate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment).
155 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
156 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
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kind."'157 However, our analysis of recent scholarly work on the influ-
ence of emotion on blame and punishment judgments, together with
our own empirical results regarding the role of sympathy on punish-
ment judgments, suggest that this danger cannot be so easily
dismissed.
C. Victim Impact Statements as Clinical Interviews: More
Information Is Not Always Better
We have discussed several psychological processes that are likely
to come into play during jurors' consideration of victim impact state-
ments, and have set forth why each of these processes, standing alone,
makes it likely that the introduction of victim impact statements will
affect punishment decisions regarding severity. We now discuss a final
reason for concern: the counterintuitive, yet robust, empirical finding
that more information is not always better, and that consideration of
certain types of information can lead to decisions that are less reliable
than decisions made in the absence of the additional information.
We begin by returning to the Court's reasoning in Payne.
In Payne, the Court's justification for allowing victim impact state-
ments was grounded in part on "balancing" the need for information
about the victim against the defendant's right to present unfettered
mitigating information.1 58 It would be unfair, the Court reasoned, to
have a one-sided presentation that included everything the defendant
could muster in mitigation, while including nothing about the victim,
because the State would be deprived of "the full moral force of its
evidence and [it would] prevent the jury from having before it all the
information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-
degree murder." 159
Thus, the concern for balancing and avoiding a one-sided presen-
tation assumes that victim impact statements contain important infor-
mation that will aid the jury in making their decision. Implicit here is
the assumption that "more is better"-i.e., more information makes
for a better decision. However, one problem with this argument is
that more information does not, in fact, always result in a better deci-
sion. In many settings in which it is possible to evaluate the quality of
decisions, the addition of certain types of information leads to a less
reliable, lower-quality decision.1 60 This is because human decision
57 Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
158 See id. at 825-26.
159 Id. at 825.
160 See, e.g., REID HAS'rIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 56 (2001) (noting that the
addition of experienced clinical judgment led to less reliable diagnoses about psychosis
compared to the use of personality test scores alone); Robyn M. Dawes, A Case Study of
Graduate Admissions: Application of Three Principles of Human Decision Making, 26 AM. PSYCHOL-
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makers tend to make systematic errors in the way they combine pieces
of information. Specifically, decision makers tend to overweight cer-
tain types of information and underweight others. 16' Under condi-
tions of improper weighting, decision makers often are better off not
considering the extra information that tends to be overweighted.
162
Therefore, more is not always better. Unfortunately, as humans we are
disposed to assume that more is better, and that if information is non-
diagnostic or non-informative, we will know it when we see it. We are
inclined to think that once we have all the information available, we
will use our reason to consider all of the pieces of information.1 63
Certain classes or categories of information are especially prone
to being overweighted in decision making, and the use of such unreli-
able information can lead to worse decisions. An example of this phe-
nomenon is the use of interviews by gatekeepers.' 64 For example,
when managers in a business organization or admissions officers in an
educational institution are given the opportunity to conduct a face-to-
face interview with a candidate, they make use of the information
gleaned from the interview to make their hiring or admission deci-
sions. 165 Unfortunately, decisions that take into account the inter-
views are systematically worse than decisions made using a simple
model that includes just a few factors that reliably predict success.' 66
In other words, a gatekeeper who makes a decision based in part on
an interview makes a less reliable decision than a gatekeeper who uses
a simple statistical prediction model (such as admitting the applicants
with the highest test scores) and no interview. People incorrectly as-
sume that they can glean a much deeper understanding of a candi-
date in a forty-five minute interview than they can from a few simple
predictive factors such as test scores.
Another example is the problem of predicting parole viola-
tions.167 A statistical model of parole success that includes the of-
OGIST 180, 182, 186-87 (1971) (indicating that the addition of personal interview informa-
tion led to less reliable graduate school admission decisions compared to the use of grades
and test scores alone).
161 One example of a specific cognitive heuristic that leads to systematic over or un-
derweighting of information is the availability heuristic, which suggests that we base the
probability of a future event on relevant examples that are cognitively accessible. That is,
we overweight examples that come to mind first. For example, people who live on flood
plains are less likely to buy flood insurance if floods have not occurred in the recent past.
See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 39-40 (2000).
.162 See Dawes, supra note 160, at 187.
163 See HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 160, at 64-65.
164 See ROBYN M. DAWES, HOUSE OF CARDS: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT ON
MY1-H 86-89 (1994).
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 SeeJohn S. Carroll et al., Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Prediction in Parole Decision Mak-
ing, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 199, 215-17 (1982).
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fender's age at first arrest, number of convictions, and number of
prison violations predicts with fairly poor success which parolees are
likely to violate parole (correlation coefficient of about .30).168 How-
ever, the prediction of experienced parole officers who use an inter-
view to predict parole success is much worse (correlation coefficient
of .06).l1t9 In other words, the decision makers would be better off
ignoring all information gleaned from the interview, and simply com-
bining the three aforementioned factors using a linear model.
The use of victim impact statements may be problematic for some
of the same reasons, although it would be difficult to prove this asser-
tion because, unlike decisions that involve predictions about future
events, there is no straightforward way of evaluating the quality ofjury
decisions. Yet, there is still a danger that rather than serving a balanc-
ing function, victim impact statements might erode the judgment of
decision makers by causing them to overweight factors contained in
such evidence. This overweighting of information in victim impact
statements is especially worrisome in light of the psychological mecha-
nisms implicated in the relationship between harm and punishment
judgments discussed earlier. 7 First, information about emotional
harm is used as a proxy for determining the severity of causal factors
leading to that harm, even when the relevant causal factors are acci-
dental.' 7 1 Second, decision makers who hear accounts of emotional
harm are likely to experience anger and other negative affective
states, increasing the likelihood that they will blame and severely pun-
ish the offender. 172 Finally, receiving information about emotional
harm triggers a search for information by decision makers that will
support the judgment about the severity of the harm.173 In sum, there
is a danger that particularly severe emotional harm suffered by the
victim or the murder victim's family members will lead to an exagger-
ated view of the defendant's culpability, because decision makers will
use the cue of severe harm to systematically overweight unknown but
important factors about the crime. This systematic overweighting is
prone to occur because, as we argue above, emotional harm, unlike
physical harm, varies so much across individuals that it is not a particu-
larly reliable indicator of relevant factors about the crime. 1 7 4
Even in the absence of wide variations in emotional harms across
individual victims, there is another reason why victim impact state-
ments might make the jury's decision more difficult. Susan Bandes
168 id. at 222.
169 Id. at 219.
170 See supra Part 1V.A-B.
171 See supra Part IV.A.
172 See supra Part IV.B.
173 See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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has argued that victim impact statements are stories that should not
be told, at least not in the context of capital sentencing, because they
interfere with the jury's ability to hear the defendant's story.' 7 5 In a
similar vein, Angela Harris has argued that victim impact statements
interfere with jurors' ability to reflect on their own emotional reac-
tions to the defendant in a self-critical manner. 176 Both Bandes and
Harris contend that victim impact statements not only evoke sympa-
thy, pity, and compassion for the victim, but they also evoke emotions
directed toward the defendant, including hatred, racial animus, vin-
dictiveness, and vengeance. 177 According to this perspective, rather
than simply making the victim more human in the eyes of the jury,
victim impact statements interfere with the jury's ability to empathize
with the defendant and comprehend his humanity. In this sense too,
then, more information is not always helpful, because the additional
information contained in victim impact statements prevents the jury
from properly considering information it possesses about the
defendant.
Finally, victim impact statements might erode the jury's judgment
by lulling jurors into a false sense of understanding. If an event, espe-
cially an event with a terrible outcome, has a causal explanation that is
comprised of random factors or multiple situational factors that are
only tenuously related to human agency, we have trouble accepting
such an explanation. Instead, we prefer to hold the simpler and more
satisfying view that bad things are caused by bad people whom we can
blame and hold accountable. For example, after TWA flight 800 ex-
ploded over Long Island, New York, in 1996, rumors quickly spread
that a missile was the cause of the crash, leading to speculation of a
U.S. government cover-up. 178 Meanwhile, the NTSB had concluded
that the most likely explanation for the crash was an electrical short
circuit that caused the airplane's fuel tank to explode.179 Even today,
however, rumors of a government conspiracy abound, precisely be-
cause the fuel tank explosion explanation is deeply unsatisfying in
that there is no human agent to blame.
Returning to the context of the criminal trial, if decision makers
use victim impact statements as a heuristic to infer unknown factors of
a crime-especially those regarding the defendant's mental state, mo-
tivation, and wickedness-the severity of emotional harm will en-
175 See Bandes, supra note 8, at 392-93.
176 See Harris, supra note 8, at 91-92.
177 See Bandes, supra note 8, at 390-91; Harris, supra note 8, at 91.
178 See Andy Pasztor, TWA Crash Probe Leaves Puzzles, Stricter Standards, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
4, 2001, § 12, at 1.
179 Aircraft Accident Report: In-flight Breakup over the Atlantic Ocean, Trans World Airlines
Hight 800, National Transportation Safety Board, at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2000/
aarOO03.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
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courage decision makers to infer the worst about the circumstances
surrounding the crime. In allowing the use of victim impact state-
ments, courts put decision makers in a position analogous to the TWA
Flight 800 conspiracy theorists by promoting salient causal factors in-
volving human agency, and downplaying the random, situational
causal factors that contribute to victim suffering. Victim impact state-
ments provide decision makers with a satisfying sense of understand-
ing, but at the expense of imposing a decision procedure that is more
likely to push the decision maker toward an unduly severe punish-
ment judgment.
CONCLUSION: REDUCING ARBITRARINESS IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING JUDGMENTS
The empirical evidence presented in this Article suggests that
judgments about criminal punishment are influenced by the content
of victim impact statements. We have argued that the emotional harm
to victims and survivors presented in victim impact statements serves
as a heuristic for inferring facts that are essentially unknowable. At
the same time, we have reason to suppose that emotional harm to
victims is not a particularly reliable heuristic for making such infer-
ences. The emotional nature of victim impact statements increases
the possibility that judges and juries will allow their own emotions to
influence their sentencing decisions. Exposure to victims' emotional
harms serves to conveniently confirm a judgment that the decision
maker has made earlier in the case, or that he or she will make later in
the case. Finally, victim impact statements might be another example
of the "more-is-worse" phenomenon. That is, the complexity of the
information contained in victim impact statements makes it unlikely
that this information will be combined and utilized in a way that relia-
bly assists the sentencing decision.
The reality of how people reason about harm and punishment
suggests that the use of victim impact statements is problematic. Yet,
this assertion is difficult to prove conclusively because, unlike deci-
sions that involve a verifiably correct answer, there is no straightfor-
ward way of evaluating the quality ofjury decisions about punishment.
The dangers identified in this Article regarding the undue influence
of victim impact statements on punishmentjudgments counsel against
their use in criminal trials, and especially in death penalty hearings.
At the same time, however, the political reality is that the use of victim
impact statements in criminal trials is not likely to disappear entirely,
at least not in the foreseeable future. The victims' rights movement is
already politically powerful and continues to gain momentum. In ad-
dition, there is widespread popular support for the notion that the
victim's voice ought to be heard at the criminal trial. Proponents of
[Vol. 88:419
VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY
victims' rights explicitly endorse the idea that juries should hear vic-
tim impact statements in capital cases because it provides them with
information about the harm the defendant has caused.18
Given this political reality, the most realistic way of limiting the
arbitrariness produced by victim impact statements is to limit their
scope. A noteworthy feature of Payne is that, aside from delineating
permissible substantive areas of the victim's character and the survi-
vors' emotional harm, 181 the Court placed virtually no limits on the
permissible scope of victim impact statements in capital sentencing
hearings. The result has been that, in the twelve years since the Court
decided Payne, prosecutors across the country have been presenting
an array of testimony, exhibits, and argument in capital sentencing
hearings under the rubric of victim impact statements. 182 By narrow-
ing the scope of admissible information contained in victim impact
statements, courts can reduce the inherent arbitrariness of their
effects." 3
180 See Greene, supra note 63, at 332.
181 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991).
182 For an excellent comprehensive review of these practices nationwide, see Logan,
supra note 8, at 151-56.
183 For example, NewJersey permits only one family member to provide victim impact
testimony in a capital trial. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996). This
rule limits the duration of the jury's exposure to victim impact testimony and therefore
might limit the powerful influence of the attributional and emotional decision biases dis-
cussed earlier. Maryland bars live victim impact testimony, and instead requires that victim
impact information be in written form, incorporated in the presentence investigation re-
port. MD. ANN. COnE art 41, §4-609(d) (1997).
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APPENDIX
VIGNETTES USED IN THE STUDY
1. Burglary Vignette
Severe Emotional Inury:
Sharon Martin's apartment was burglarized while she was away.
She had gone to visit her parents for the weekend. When she re-
turned, she walked into her apartment and found that someone had
come in and ransacked it. Her belongings were thrown all over the
floor. Herjewelry and her computer were stolen. Several weeks later,
a suspect was arrested when he was caught trying to break into an-
other apartment in the neighborhood. The defendant confessed to
the burglary of Sharon Martin's apartment, and eventually pled guilty
in court. At the sentencing hearing, the judge hears the defendant's
account of the crime, and hears from Sharon Martin. She says that
the burglary has made her feel very afraid, vulnerable and depressed.
She stayed horae from work for two days after the burglary. Now she
is back at work, but she still has problems sleeping. She finds herself
worrying often that something similar will happen to her again, and
she can't stop thinking about the fact that she will probably never get
her jewelry or her computer back. The defendant has a criminal re-
cord that includes several burglaries and thefts.
Mild Emotional Injury:
Sharon Martin's apartment was burglarized while she was away.
She had gone to visit her parents for the weekend. When she re-
turned, she walked into her apartment and found that someone had
come in and ransacked it. Her belongings were thrown all over the
floor. Herjewelry and her computer were stolen. Several weeks later,
a suspect was arrested when he was caught trying to break into an-
other apartment in the neighborhood. The defendant confessed to
the burglary of Sharon Martin's apartment, and eventually pled guilty
in court. At the sentencing hearing, the judge hears the defendant's
account of the crime, and hears from Sharon Martin. She says that
when the burglary first happened, it made her feel angry. But after
several days her anger faded, and she went about normal activities
without thinking much about what happened. She feels like these
types of things are bound to happen to people living in a big city, and
she doesn't let it bother her, even though she knows she will probably
never get her jewelry or computer back. The defendant has a crimi-
nal record that includes several burglaries and thefts.
Control:
Sharon Martin's apartment was burglarized while she was away.
She had gone to visit her parents for the weekend. When she re-
turned, she walked into her apartment and found that someone had
come in and ransacked it. Her belongings were thrown all over the
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floor. Herjewelry and her computer were stolen. Several weeks later,
a suspect was arrested when he was caught trying to break into an-
other apartment in the neighborhood. The defendant confessed to
the burglary of Sharon Martin's apartment, and eventually pled guilty
in court. At the sentencing hearing, the judge hears the defendant's
account of the crime, and hears from Sharon Martin. She says that
she knows she will probably never get her jewelry or computer back.
The defendant has a criminal record that includes several burglaries
and thefts.
2. Robbery Vignette
Severe Emotional Injury:
Renee Thompson was robbed of her purse while walking down
the street. She had just come out of a Walgreen's store a few minutes
before when she felt someone yank her purse from behind and knock
her to the ground. The purse contained $120 cash, as well as credit
cards, a cellular phone, and other personal items. She suffered a frac-
tured wrist and scrapes and bruises. The police arrested the defen-
dant the next day after a witness came forward. They found Ms.
Thompson's credit cards in the defendant's pocket. The defendant
eventually pled guilty to robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the
judge hears the defendant's account of the crime, and hears from Re-
nee Thompson. She says that the robbery has made her feel very
afraid, vulnerable, and depressed. She stayed home from work for
two weeks after the robbery. Now she is back at work, but she still has
problems sleeping. Before the robbery, she used to have an active
social life with many friends; but ever since the robbery she rarely goes
out. She finds herself worrying often that something similar will hap-
pen to her again, and she can't stop thinking about what happened.
The defendant has prior crimes on his record, including two armed
robberies where he displayed a gun.
Mild Emotional Injury:
Renee Thompson was robbed of her purse while walking down
the street. She had just come out of a Walgreen's store a few minutes
before when she felt someone yank her purse from behind and knock
her to the ground. The purse contained $120 cash, as well as credit
cards, a cellular phone, and other personal items. She suffered a frac-
tured wrist and scrapes and bruises. The police arrested the defen-
dant the next day after a witness came forward. They found Ms.
Thompson's credit cards in the defendant's pocket. The defendant
eventually pled guilty to robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the
judge hears the defendant's account of the crime, and hears from Re-
nee Thompson. She says that when the robbery first happened, it
made her feel angry. But she went back to work right away, and after
several days her anger faded, and she went about her normal activities
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without thinking much about what happened. She still has an active
social life with many friends. She feels like these types of things are
bound to happen to people living in a big city, and she doesn't let it
bother her. The defendant has prior crimes on his record, including
two armed robberies where he displayed a gun.
Control:
Renee Thompson was robbed of her purse while walking down
the street. She had just come out of a Walgreen's store a few minutes
before when she felt someone yank her purse from behind and knock
her to the ground. The purse contained $120 cash, as well as credit
cards, a cellular phone, and other personal items. She suffered a frac-
tured wrist and scrapes and bruises. The police arrested the defen-
dant the next day after a witness came forward. They found Ms.
Thompson's credit cards in the defendant's pocket. The defendant
eventually pled guilty to robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the
judge hears the defendant's account of the crime, and hears from Re-
nee Thompson. The defendant has prior crimes on his record, in-
cluding two armed robberies where he displayed a gun.
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